The Use of Telecommunications Companies in Contemporary International Conflicts: SpaceX as a Case Study

Section: Research Paper

Abstract

Research Idea: SpaceX has emerged as an important contributor to the changing cybersecurity landscape amid contemporary international conflicts, not simply because it operates a global satellite-based internet service, but because of its growing influence on state sovereignty. The company has contributed to changing conceptions of power, sovereignty, and cyber warfare while deepening the security dilemma surrounding the dual-use nature of civilian and military technologies.


Objective: The research aims to examine the cybersecurity dilemma associated with global information networks, assess how SpaceX has emerged as an influential non-state actor, and explore the future of international conflicts in light of the growing technological capabilities of state-affiliated entities.


Methodology: The research employs two complementary approaches: the descriptive approach, to examine non-state actors and situate SpaceX within this broader context; and the systems analysis approach, to examine inputs, outputs, and the interactions between them.


Results: The findings indicate that the technological maturity of private companies has enabled some of them to influence political decision-making. They also reveal a new security dilemma involving attacks on state infrastructure without clear mechanisms of attribution or accountability, while highlighting digital sovereignty, national data repositories, and the risks of growing digital dependency.


Conclusion: SpaceX has demonstrated the capacity to enable or restrict internet access in conflict-affected areas through extensive reliance on its infrastructure and amid limited international regulation of satellite operations. This has expanded the use of internet infrastructure from civilian connectivity to military communications, drone navigation, and strike coordination, creating a new arena of conflict characterized by technological dependency and cybersecurity risks.


 

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The Use of Telecommunications Companies in Contemporary International Conflicts: SpaceX as a Case Study. (2026). مجلة دراسات إقلیمیة, 20(70), 263-282. https://doi.org/10.33899/rsj.v20i70.63856
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How to Cite

The Use of Telecommunications Companies in Contemporary International Conflicts: SpaceX as a Case Study. (2026). مجلة دراسات إقلیمیة, 20(70), 263-282. https://doi.org/10.33899/rsj.v20i70.63856