A Critique of Realism in International Relations: From the Conflict of Interests to Moral Reasonableness in John Rawls’s Thought

Research Idea: This research critically examines the philosophical foundations of realist theory in international relations, which tend to reduce global politics to material conflicts of interest and to treat assumptions about anarchy and self-interest as axiomatic.

Objective: The research aims to deconstruct these premises and demonstrate their hypothetical nature by employing the normative framework developed by John Rawls, particularly his concepts of “realistic utopia” and the “Law of Peoples.”

Methodology: The research adopts a comparative critical-analytical approach. It first deconstructs realist assumptions, then reconstructs key Rawlsian concepts such as “moral reasonableness” and the “duties of peoples,” before systematically comparing the two frameworks.

Results: The findings suggest that realist categories are not neutral empirical facts but theoretical constructs open to critique. Rawls’s framework provides a radical normative critique that exposes internal contradictions within realist assumptions and challenges their claim to necessity.

Conclusion: The research concludes that Rawls’s idea of a realistic utopia offers an alternative vision of international order grounded in moral legitimacy rather than balance of power. It further calls for the development of a “new realism” that recognizes the possibility of reasonable cooperation and redefines interest in light of global justice. In doing so, the research contributes a distinctive theoretical addition to the philosophical critique of realism and proposes a transformative path for renewing both thought and practice in international politics.